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Conclusion
During the first few years following the end of World War II, Malaya’s Chi-
nese community continued to hold on to the strong China-oriented identity
consciousness that it had developed during the late 1930s. On questions con-
cerning the protection of their rights in Malaya and what the future of Malaya
ought to be, the actions of the Malayan Chinese centered largely around the
activities of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), and they showed little
interest in the comparatively broad range of rights guaranteed them under the
Malayan Union scheme proposed in October 1945, due by and large to apa-
thy caused by a feeling among the majority of Chinese that Malaya was not
their homeland but merely a temporary place of residence. The prevailing
feeling at the time was that even if they would obtain Malayan citizenship,
they should hold on to their Chinese nationality, and since the legal scheme
offered by the British allowed them to do so, it is little wonder that no one in
the Chinese community thought of discarding his Chinese nationality and
giving up his right to participate in China’s internal affairs. Under such con-
ditions, the Malayan Chinese movement to demand legitimate rights in their
country of residence was by no means contradictory to the movement to
strengthen China. It is for this reason that we see even the MCP referring to
China as the homeland and becoming actively involved in supporting the
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) efforts in China.
Involvement in China’s internal affairs usually meant supporting either the
CCP or the Kuomintang (KMT). Immediately after the war, both CCP and
KMT support groups in Malaya joined together in commemorating such events
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as China’s victory in its anti-Japanese war and the Double Tenth, the begin-
ning of the Republican revolt against the Qing dynasty on October 10, 1911.
As tensions and rivalry between the two parties increased in China, these
celebrations in Malaya were divided into separate venues along party lines.
The gatherings and activities supporting the CCP were quashed in January
of 1950, ironically in the same month in which diplomatic relations were
established between Britain and the People’s Republic of China. The last large-
scale public gatherings in Malaya to support the CCP were none other than
the celebrations commemorating that event.
From the frequency with which CCP support rallies and gatherings were
taking place up until their suppression, the diversity of the groups participat-
ing in them, and the number of Malayan Chinese who got involved, we can
get a very good idea of the level of influence which China exerted within the
Chinese community during the late 1940s.
Both the Malayan-born leftist groups, beginning with the MCP, and the
China-born leftist organizations, beginning with the Malayan branch of the
China Democratic League (CDL), had been declared illegal by the British
colonial authorities during the late 1940s; and from that time on those Ma-
layan-born leftist factions which were able to survive lost interest in Chinese
affairs and began concentrating on Malayan national liberation struggles, pri-
marily because in Malaya the main issue had become the obtaining of rights
as Malayan citizens. (Nevertheless, the political stance and struggle strategy
taken by these groups almost always followed the CCP party line; in this
regard, the MCP made no effort to develop a position and strategy of its own
right up until it was virtually disbanded in 1989.) The Malayan Chinese farm-
ers, who formed one of the main bases of support for the MCP, were no dif-
ferent. They too became well aware of the importance of gaining guarantees
to landownership rights and earning a livelihood in Malaya, and in the pro-
cess lost interest in what was happening in China’s politics. There were three
political forces during that time which grappled with the issues of obtaining
and protecting the rights of the local Chinese as Malayans. These three were
the MCP, the Chinese consulates in Malaya, and the Malayan Chinese Asso-
ciation (MCA). Due to its suppression and subsequent underground guerrilla
activities, the MCP lost the ability to play any legal and active role in protect-
ing the civil rights of the local Chinese, while the Chinese consulates, on
which the Malayan Chinese community had high hopes, were shown to be
powerless to help. In the end, it was the MCA which played the most effec-
tive role as a legitimate Malaya-oriented organization able to bring forth a
Malayan identity consciousness within the local Chinese community includ-
ing the Chinese farmers.
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Many of the nonpolitical organizations which sympathized with the CCP
went through a period of transformation during the early half of the 1950s
during which they either disappeared altogether or lost interest in the CCP
and China and transformed themselves into Malaya-oriented organizations.
The organizations which disappeared were primarily those which had been
directly associated with the CCP or CDL, or had become deeply involved in
the activities of these two China-based political parties. Those who trans-
formed themselves into Malaya-oriented organizations were mainly those
which had been tied to China for more emotional than ideological reasons.
The main motivation for their transformation, as we have seen in the case of
the Singapore Fujian Association (Hokkien Huay Kuan), lay in the all impor-
tant necessity to obtaining legitimate rights as full-fledged citizens of Ma-
laya, or at least in the all important necessity perceived by the leadership
ranks of these organizations.
While many leaders of the CCP-affiliated political groups in Malaya were
deported to China, many others returned to China of their own accord in
order to battle the KMT or participate in the People’s Republic state-building
process. Of the leaders who remained in Malaya, there were those who were
arrested and imprisoned or fled underground to join the MCP’s guerrilla forces;
but the majority gradually adopted a strong sense of belonging to Malayan
society. Judging from the changing editorial position presented in local Chi-
nese-language newspapers and the conditions under which Malayan Chinese
became involved in local politics, it seems that over several years the whole
Chinese community in Malaya followed a similar path.
It is difficult for us to determine whether it was the strong-arm, repressive
tactics of the British authorities or the transformation in consciousness taking
place in the Malayan Chinese community that resulted in what actually came
to pass. Both were indeed important factors, but probably more important
were (1) it becoming crucially important for the Malayan Chinese to obtain
legitimate rights to a livelihood in Malaya, and (2) the establishment of the
PRC no longer requiring support to the CCP from overseas Chinese, or con-
versely, economic policies of land reform, implemented by the new PRC re-
gime to confiscate the wealth of overseas Chinese or their families on the
mainland, sparking an anti-PRC reaction abroad. One more important inter-
nal factor was undoubtedly frustration over the local Chinese consulates’ pow-
erlessness to help the Malayan Chinese community in any way.
After CCP organizational activities were completely blocked, KMT-affili-
ated groups were tacitly allowed to continue. However, restrictions on these
groups were gradually strengthened, and the KMT’s biggest yearly event, the
Double Tenth celebrations, ceased to be held in 1958, the year after Malayan
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independence was attained. Here we find a very important indicator of the
local Chinese community’s level of Malayanization at the time.
In Chapter 2 we looked at the Malayanization of the local Chinese-lan-
guage newspapers. On October 20, 1949, the largest of these publications,
the Nanyang Siang Pau, changed the way it dated issues from the system
used by the Republic of China to the Western calendar format. The second
leading Chinese-language newspaper, the Sin Chew Jit Poh, followed suit on
January 7, 1950. Moreover, just after the war, over half of the newspaper
publication holidays were connected to such Chinese holidays as the com-
memoration of the birth and death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of Repub-
lic of China; however, by the mid-1950s the relation of such holidays to Chi-
nese events was becoming blurred, as newspapers merely announced that a
“regularly scheduled publication holiday” would be taken. Then in the 1960s
the holiday schedule was changed altogether.
In addition, the fifteen-member staff of overseas correspondents in China
employed by the Nanyang Siang Pau in 1950 had dwindled to none by March
1954.
In October 1957, shortly after the August 31 independence of the Federa-
tion of Malaya, the Nanyang Siang Pau featured an essay on the theme of
“‘our country’ is no longer China but Malaya.”
The above facts represent ample proof of the way in which Chinese-lan-
guage newspapers gradually Malayanized their editorial position through the
1950s, making Merdeka on August 31, 1957 their biggest and most notice-
able indication of Malayanization.
There were two Chinese consulates general and five consulates in Malaya
and British Borneo. The Chinese government regarded all of the overseas
Chinese as Chinese nationals from the standpoint of jus sanguinis. Here lies
the main reason why Chinese consulates took up the issue of protecting the
civil rights for all overseas Chinese, and overseas Chinese communities, in
their turn, looked to “their” consulates to help protect their civil rights. How-
ever, due to a number of reasons including (1) the weak stand of China in
international relations, (2) China’s exhaustion stemming from the CCP-KMT
civil war, and (3) the division of the Malayan Chinese community along CCP
and KMT party lines (not to mention the CCP factions demanding that consu-
lates defend their rights while warning them not to interfere in Malayan is-
sues), the Chinese consulates were in most cases not able to meet the expec-
tations of the local Chinese community. On the other hand, during the first
half of the 1950s, the MCA, which was founded in 1949, stepped in to play
the role that the Chinese consulates were unable to play. The process that
produced this state of affairs decisively diluted any sense of belonging that
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the Malayan Chinese community had toward China and enhanced the growth
of a Malaya-oriented identity consciousness.
Due to the positions taken by the governments of both the Republic of
China (ROC) and the PRC stating that Chinese people residing outside of
their borders were still under their jurisdiction and protection, the ROC Na-
tional Assembly in 1948 and the PRC National People’s Congress in 1954
both tried to select overseas Chinese representatives to these congresses
through local elections in the countries of residence. However, in Malaya
such decisions prompted reactions from the British authorities, forcing the
ROC to hold irregular, limited elections, and the PRC to select representa-
tives based on discussions among those who had returned to China from
Malaya. In the view of the leftist supporters in Malaya, the National Assem-
bly elections were merely shabby performances by the KMT and were none
of their business; but the way that elections were held for the People’s Con-
gresses worked to distance the Malayan left even farther from what was hap-
pening on the mainland.
In the field of education, textbooks used in Chinese schools, which had
formerly been written and published in China, began in the early 1950s to be
compiled in Malaya; and the content began to refer increasingly to the real
local situation. By the mid-1950s textbooks had been completely Malayanized.
Many of the CCP-inclined teachers, who had so greatly influenced the Chi-
nese youth of Malaya through a curriculum based on patriotism toward China,
returned to China around 1950.
The year 1948 marked the last time the Olympic Games would provide an
occasion for overseas Chinese to demonstrate their China-oriented identity
consciousness as overseas Chinese athletes participated as members of the
team from China. Singapore began sending its own team to the games in
1952, and the Federation of Malaya followed suit in 1956. Malayan and
Singaporean Chinese athletes were selected as members of their respective
national teams.
In terms of a time frame for the conversion of consciousness discussed in
this book, all of the major developments as below that indicate the firm estab-
lishment of a Malaya-oriented identity consciousness within the Malayan
Chinese community centered around the mid-1950s, on the eve of Merdeka
which came in 1957: the disappearance of the Double Tenth celebrations in
the Federation of Malaya (1957) and Singapore (1958), the complete disap-
pearance of CCP-affiliated organizations or their transformation into Malaya-
oriented groups (mid-1950s); convening the Grand Rally of Literators Re-
sponding to the Independence Movement (1956); holding the Representa-
tives’ Congress of All Malayan Registered Guilds and Associations (1956);
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the change in reference of the Chinese terms for “fatherland,” “homeland,”
and “our country” from China to Malaya that took place in the local Chinese-
language newspapers (1957); the blurring and eventual end of Chinese fac-
tors in determining Chinese-language newspaper publication holidays (latter
half of the 1950s); the disappearance of foreign correspondents hired by Chi-
nese-language newspapers to work in China (first half of the 1950s); the sub-
stitution of the MCA for Chinese consulates in the task of protecting the rights
of local Chinese (first half of the 1950s); the Malayanization of Chinese school
textbooks (mid-1950s); and the Malayanization of local Chinese Olympic
athletes (1956). The process of forming an independent, sovereign nation-
state in any region is deeply connected to the fomentation and promotion of a
national consciousness among its people. In the case of Malaya, such a phe-
nomenon occurred among its Chinese residents who realized in just ten years
a tremendous reduction in the passionate sense of belonging they had felt
toward China immediately after the end of the war.
This conversion was not totally voluntary, for the repressive measures, such
as mass deportation, that the British implemented cannot be brushed aside as
insignificant. There is no denying that the process had its painful aspect. Fur-
thermore, to assume that Malaya-oriented identity consciousness of Malayan
Chinese had already been well established at the end of the war, without try-
ing to analyze the conversion of their identity consciousness after the war, is
equivalent to ignoring the pain and anguish experienced in the process. This
is an important reason why examining this China connection has been neces-
sary.
Following Merdeka, it is possible to divide the political organizations ac-
tive in the Malayan Chinese communities into roughly three types: middle-
of-the-road and right-wing groups centered around the MCA; legally active
moderate leftist groups centered around the Labor Party (LP; est. 1952) and
received support from workers, farmers, small-scale merchants, and intellec-
tuals; and the outlawed left-wing centered around the MCP. The MCP would
soon be forced further deep into the jungles and thus cease to influence the
Chinese masses. Taking its place was the LP, which strove to protect the rights
of workers and “New Village” farmers and promote Chinese education, while
at the same time emphasizing collaboration with the Malay non-elite com-
munity. In 1957 the LP was successful in forming the Socialist Front in con-
junction with the Party Rakyat (PR), its moderate Malay leftist counterpart.
However, in 1966 the parties split over the language question. From that time
on the LP became radicalized under the influence of the Cultural Revolution
in China, and decided to conduct a struggle outside the realm of parliamen-
tary politics. Its suppression by the Malaysian government brought on the
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loss of support within the local Chinese community, and it was officially
deregistered as a political organization in 1972. There is no doubt that the LP
was a Malaya (Malaysia)-oriented political party, but the Cultural Revolution
being the decisive factor in its radicalization during the late 1960s indicates
that the party had a inclination toward ideologies and ideas Chinese, or at
least had CCP sympathies. However, the LP had absolutely no connection
with or involvement in Chinese internal affairs, making the nature of its ori-
entation totally different from what was embraced by leftist organizations
which existed in the 1940s and 1950s. Prior to the time of the Cultural Revo-
lution, the China-orientation of the late 1940s and the 1950s had already be-
come archaic remnants never again to be revived. After the LP’s blacklisting,
it was the Democratic Action Party (DAP; est. 1964) that stepped in to repre-
sent the lower-class Malaysians of Chinese descent. While the DAP has em-
phasized both the protection of legitimate civil rights of the Chinese and the
preservation of Chinese culture, it has given no special meaning to nor held
any sympathy for China.
As for the MCA, despite being rocked by internal strife and schisms from
time to time, it has remained the mainstream political organization of the
Chinese community through its emphasis on compromise and cooperation
with the United Malays National Organization, Malaysia’s overwhelmingly
largest party in the ruling coalition party. In the 1974 parliamentary elections
that were held just after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the
PRC, the MCA won a resounding victory over the DAP, no doubt a result of
the joy felt in the Chinese community in general over the treaty. Although it
showed their deeply rooted nostalgic sentiment toward China, such senti-
ment at that time was no more than a familiarity with China felt by Malaysian
Chinese as unwavering Malaysians, and cannot be interpreted as “China-ori-
ented” by any stretch of the imagination. Since that time the MCA and DAP
have both experienced ups and downs in the elections, based on the popular-
ity of their exclusively Malaysia-oriented platforms. No Chinese issue has
ever become a focal point of any election. The Malaysian identity conscious-
ness of Malaysian Chinese has long since become soundly and deeply estab-
lished.
